Proprietary ·
Brevo embedded scripts delivered ClickFix and WordPress malware
Brevo served modified tracker and chat scripts through its own infrastructure. The injected code showed ClickFix lures to visitors and attempted to install a malicious WordPress plugin when administrators browsed affected sites.
Websites using Brevo's chat and tracking scripts delivered an attack through a supplier they already trusted on September 14. Sansec found altered JavaScript on Brevo's infrastructure and embedded customer pages. A site owner did not have to install a new plugin or change a page for the malicious script to reach visitors.
The injected code loaded another script from subdomains of Brevo's sendibt1.com domain. It then chose between two paths: attempting a plugin installation through a logged-in WordPress administrator, or presenting other visitors with a fake human-verification prompt that asked them to paste and run a command.
Sansec did not recover the WordPress plugin, so its suspected backdoor function remained unverified. The firm's monitoring recorded 2,549 policy-violation reports across 12 sites, not that many infected people. Its estimate of more than 100,000 sites embedding Brevo services described potential reach rather than a confirmed victim count.
The observed distribution window ended at 20:12:53 UTC, but cached copies generated reports into the following day. Sansec suspected compromise of Brevo's Cloudflare account from infrastructure evidence; Brevo had not confirmed that explanation. Cleaning the supplier's live scripts therefore did not immediately remove every copy already held downstream.
Notes
- Sansec observed subsequent delivery from cached copies. The September 10 account incident is not treated as proof of the cause of the September 14 script compromise.
Appendix · Affected releases
References
Source record: proprietary/brevo/meta.yaml